Introduction:
In the first instalment of our series, we discussed the first investigation at Joe’s Retail, which failed to detect a critical piece of malware and left the breach unaddressed. This second post will delve into the next chapter of the story: the second investigation almost a year later, which uncovered the missed malware but struggled with effective containment, allowing the breach to persist.
Almost a year later, Joe’s Retail was approached once more in regards to another CPP alert from a card brand. They chose a different listed PFI firm to investigate this time around; but once more it was only an Independent Investigation. This time the investigation team performed a more thorough investigation by obtaining a full disk image of the respective server.
Using a full disk image for analysis, the team identified the second PHP backdoor that had been missed during the initial investigation. This backdoor had provided the attacker(s) with persistent access to the network. The use of a full disk image allowed for a more thorough data set for examination of the server.
Post-investigation, Joe's Retail implemented several security measures, such as updating plugins, changing passwords, implementing Multi Factor Authentication (MFA) on the administrative panel via email, and moving the admin panel from its default location. However, these measures were still insufficient to fully secure the environment. Without a comprehensive security strategy, the attacker found ways to reintroduce the malware.
Despite the improved evidence collection, the team failed to analyse all relevant log data, including the Web Application Firewall (WAF) logs. These logs, dating back to May 2022, contained critical information about the attacker(s) activities. The omission of these logs left significant gaps in understanding the attack timeline and methods.
The second investigation at Joe’s Retail highlighted the importance of thorough log analysis and effected containment strategies. While some progress was made in identifying missed threats, the failure to fully contain the attacker(s) foothold allowed the breach to continue. In the final instalment, we will detail our comprehensive investigation, which finally brought the breach under control, and discuss the measures implemented to prevent future incidents.
Stay tuned for the next post in our series.